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I. INTRODUCTION
For many noncitizens today, the law of asylum exists as the sole
route to lawful residence in the United States.  The safety and relief
that the mere borderlines of our nation secure for some of the most
desperate and oppressed are accessed only through this one body of
law.  Though it may not say so on the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty,
passage through Emma Lazarus’s “golden door”1 (or, in other cases,
permission to stay on this side of the door) for “the homeless, tempest-
tost”2 requires, for many, navigation through the modern obstacles of
asylum law.  Needless to say, there is not merely one door to this coun-
try.  Nor is there a single key that opens them all.  Whether a claim of
asylum is successful and, therefore, whether a noncitizen is able to
enjoy the refuge that this country provides, depends very much on
what part of the country the noncitizen inhabits.
Those seeking asylum in the vast expanse of the American Mid-
west may notice that the door has recently gotten smaller.  In Gaitan
v. Holder,3 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals fundamentally
changed the requirements of attaining asylee status by formally re-
quiring that a particular social group (PSG), one of the protected asy-
lum classes in the Immigration and Nationality Act4 (INA), possess
1. EMMA LAZARUS, THE NEW COLOSSUS (1883).
2. Id.
3. Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 11-1525, 2012 WL
2367600 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2012).
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1101–1537 (2006).
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the limiting characteristics of “social visibility” and “particularity.”5
At first glance, Gaitan does not appear to be the culprit in altering the
asylum scheme in the Eighth Circuit, as the court merely purported to
“follow” two of its own recent cases,6 Constanza v. Holder7 and Ortiz-
Puentes v. Holder,8 which adopted the particularity and social visibil-
ity requirements established by the Board of Immigration Appeals9
(BIA).  However, neither Constanza nor Ortiz-Puentes addressed the
issue of whether the BIA acted “arbitrarily and capriciously in adding
the requirements of ‘social visibility’ and ‘particularity’ to its defini-
tion of ‘particular social group.’”10  By answering no, the Gaitan ma-
jority unequivocally changed particularity and social visibility from
being “some of the many factors in the holistic analysis of the issue to
absolute prerequisites to establishing membership in a particular so-
cial group”11 and thus took sides in the split among the federal
circuits.
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Gaitan was a momentous develop-
ment in federal immigration jurisprudence and will have dire effects
on asylum seekers in the American Midwest.  The decision illuminates
a unique aspect of immigration law12: one who seeks asylum on the
basis of a PSG in Illinois (the Seventh Circuit) may be admitted,13
while the same noncitizen may be excluded in Nebraska (the Eighth
Circuit) for not meeting the particularity and social visibility criteria
now solidified by Gaitan.  This characteristic is especially important
as to asylum, where decisions can potentially mean the difference be-
tween life and death of the petitioner.14  In Part II, this Note traces
5. Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 681–82.
6. Id. at 681.
7. Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 2011).
8. Ortiz-Puentes v. Holder, 662 F.3d 481 (8th Cir. 2011).
9. “The highest administrative tribunal for interpreting and applying the United
States immigration law, esp. reviewing appeals from adverse decisions of immi-
gration judges and district directors of the Department of Homeland Security.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 197 (9th ed. 2009).
10. Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 682 (Bye, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 685.
12. See Matthew Shelton Nestrud, Misguided Interpretation Is Not “Immutable”: A
Critique of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ Interpretation of “Membership in a
Particular Social Group” Under United States Asylum Law—A Proposed Stan-
dard, 5 J. MARSHALL L. J., 597, 607–08 (2012) (“Decisions by federal Courts of
Appeal are binding on the BIA only in cases arising from the circuit in which the
applicant applied for asylum.”).
13. See, e.g., Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009); Benitez Ramos v. Holder,
589 F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2009).
14. See Ardestani v. I.N.S., 502 U.S. 129, 140 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The
alien’s stake in [a deportation] proceeding is enormous (sometimes life or death in
the asylum context) . . . .”); Albathani v. I.N.S., 318 F.3d 365, 378 (1st Cir. 2003)
(“Immigration decisions, especially in asylum cases, may have life or death conse-
quences, and so the costs of error are very high.”); Rodriguez-Roman v. I.N.S., 98
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the relatively recent history of asylum law, with a specific focus on the
particularity and social visibility requirements, to understand the ba-
sis on which the Eighth Circuit took sides in this federal circuit split.
Part III of this Note criticizes the prudence of Gaitan’s holding in cas-
ually accepting the BIA’s new PSG formulation and proposes the
Eighth Circuit rely on the original PSG standard set out in In re
Acosta15 in future cases.
Gaitan unjustifiably moved the Eighth Circuit to a stricter, more
exclusive vision of asylum law and gave legal credence to an arbitrary
and capricious PSG formulation created by the BIA.  This Note pro-
poses the Eighth Circuit overturn Gaitan insofar as it adopted the
BIA’s new PSG formulation16 and revert back to the Acosta standard
that most fairly governs federal asylum law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Seeking and Attaining Asylum in the United States
Because immigration is a highly administrative body of law in the
United States, inquiry into the status of noncitizens relies heavily
upon federal statutes and regulations.  The premier source of this law
is the expansive INA.  In order to qualify for asylum under this legis-
lation, an applicant must meet one of the five protected grounds under
the statutory definition of “refugee”17:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion.18
This Note will focus only upon the protected ground of membership in
a particular social group.
Petitions for asylum are categorized as either “affirmative” or “de-
fensive,” depending on the status of the applicant at the time of her
application: noncitizens who are in legal nonimmigrant status file “af-
firmative” asylum applications, whereas “defensive” asylum applica-
tions are filed in response to removal proceedings already instituted
against the noncitizen.19  Defensive asylum applications are exclu-
F.3d 416, 432 (9th Cir. 1996) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (noting the “life or death”
importance of judicial review in asylum cases).
15. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Moghar-
rabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
16. The Eighth Circuit can overturn its own precedent if sitting en banc. See U.S. v.
Billue, 576 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting U.S. v. Mickleson, 433 F.3d
1050, 1052 (8th Cir. 2006)).
17. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208, 8 U.S.C.§ 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006).
18. Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (emphasis added).
19. Nitzan Sternberg, Do I Need to Pin a Target to My Back?: The Definition of “Par-
ticular Social Group” in U.S. Asylum Law, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 245, 256 (2011)
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sively adjudicated by an Immigration Judge (IJ) who makes the initial
determination of whether the applicant meets the statutory definition
of “refugee.”20  If the applicant receives an adverse determination, the
IJ’s decision can be appealed to the BIA.21  While severely limited in
reviewing the IJ’s findings of fact,22 the BIA is allowed to “review
questions of law, discretion, and judgment” of IJ decisions de novo.23
BIA decisions are then appealed to the federal circuit in which the IJ
made the initial determination.24
B. The Evolution of Particular Social Group
1. International Asylum Standards
Modern asylum law can be traced back to international standards
promulgated in the immediate post-World War II era Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees25 (1951 Convention).26  Adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly, the 1951 Convention was writ-
ten to establish a worldwide standard of refugee and asylee status.27
To that end, it defined “refugee” as a person who,
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having
a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return
to it.28
Though not a signatory of the 1951 Convention,29 the United States
would honor this standard by ratifying the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees30 (1967 Protocol), which incorporated the origi-
nal 1951 Convention definition.31  Though the Protocol was unenforce-
(citing 3-33 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMI-
GRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 34.02 (2010)).
20. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b); § 208.14(a) (2012).  The applicant has the burden of proof
in establishing he or she meets that definition.  8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a).
21. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(9).
22. See id. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).
23. Id. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii).
24. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2).
25. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150
[hereinafter 1951 Convention].
26. Nestrud, supra note 12, at 602. R
27. Id.
28. 1951 Convention, supra note 25, at 152.
29. Nestrud, supra note 12, at 602. R
30. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223 [herein-
after 1967 Protocol].
31. See id at 6225.
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able in U.S. courts,32 the definition of refugee therein would become
federal law when Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980.33  The Ref-
ugee Act implemented, with very minor changes, the original defini-
tion of the 1951 Convention.34  “Therefore, the definition of refugee in
U.S. statutory law comes directly from international law.”35
2. Federal Agency Interpretation and Judicial Deference
Though the INA’s provisions were drawn substantially from inter-
national standards, the United States created its own PSG formula-
tions through federal agencies that are tasked with enforcing the
statute.  However, the INA does not expressly specify what a particu-
lar social group is or what it means to be a member thereof.  This task
of administering unclear legislative provisions is nothing new—the
United States Supreme Court has given federal agencies great discre-
tion in interpreting congressional legislation to make up for legislative
ambiguities like those found in the INA.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.36
is the landmark administrative law case that gave the BIA this power.
In Chevron, the United States Supreme Court held that federal ad-
ministrative bodies, like the BIA, have wide authority to interpret fed-
eral legislation they are charged with administering: “If Congress has
explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation
of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the stat-
ute by regulation.”37  This so-called “Chevron deference” keeps courts
from interfering with an agency’s statutory construction, “unless [it is]
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”38  Even
though the BIA acts as a “quasi-judicial body,”39 the Supreme Court
has held that Chevron applies to the Board’s statutory interpreta-
tions.40  Because the INA leaves a large “gap” in the definition of PSG,
and because Chevron only establishes remote outer limits on adminis-
trative interpretation, the BIA’s decisions regarding PSG membership
have been and will continue to be given great weight by federal courts.
32. See Abdelwahed v. I.N.S., 22 F. App’x 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that “the
Protocol does not give [an asylum petitioner] any rights beyond what he already
enjoys under the immigration statutes”).
33. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201, 94. Stat. 102.
34. See id.
35. Sternberg, supra note 19, at 259.
36. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
37. Id. at 843–44.
38. Id. at 844.
39. Lee v. I.N.S., 685 F.2d 343, 344 (9th Cir. 1982).
40. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516–17 (2009).
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a. In re Acosta
The BIA’s first administrative interpretation of PSG came in
Acosta.41  In that case, a citizen of El Salvador sought asylum on the
basis of membership in a PSG consisting of taxi drivers who refused to
give in to demands by guerilla groups to participate in work stop-
pages.42  Although the BIA construed the meaning of membership in a
PSG in a relatively liberal manner, the respondent failed to meet
asylee status under the statute “because [his] membership in the
group . . . was something he had the power to change.”43  Because the
class was not defined by an “immutable characteristic,”44 the BIA
would not recognize it as a PSG under the INA.
The BIA formulated its definition of PSG by looking to the other
protected classes in the statute.45  Using the doctrine of ejusdem
generis, the BIA extrapolated from the nature of race, religion, nation-
ality, and political opinion that a PSG consists of members who “share
a common, immutable characteristic . . . that the members of the
group either cannot change, or should not be required to change be-
cause it is fundamental to their individual identities or conscience.”46
Thus, under Acosta, the question for tribunals considering an asserted
PSG became whether the noncitizen “was able by his own actions to
avoid the persecution.”47
The BIA consistently adhered to the Acosta formulation for the
next two decades in a myriad of asylum cases.48  Federal circuit courts
including the Eighth Circuit gave the same adherence.49  However,
this deference would not last forever, as the Acosta standard gave way
to stricter, more limiting tests.
b. The Rise of Social Visibility and Particularity
The Acosta standard would control issues of membership in a PSG
until, in 2006, the BIA began adding to the formula.  That year, the
BIA considered whether a group of “noncriminal drug informants
41. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 234 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 233.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 234.
48. See Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 683 (8th Cir.) (Bye, J., concurring) (listing
numerous BIA cases that relied on Acosta in granting asylum for those claiming
membership in a particular social group), cert. denied, No. 11-1525, 2012 WL
2367600 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2012).
49. Id. See also C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 955–56 (B.I.A.) (discussing cases from
multiple federal circuits that relied on the Acosta formulation), aff’d, Castillo-
Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006).
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working against [a] Cali drug cartel” should be granted asylum.50  The
BIA rejected the claim on two bases.51  First, the purported group
failed to meet the Acosta standard, in that the immutable characteris-
tic of the respondent’s “past experiences” did not warrant protection
since he was “aware of the risks involved” and was thus “not in a posi-
tion to claim refugee status [merely because] such risks material-
ize[d].”52  Second, and more remarkable, was the BIA’s holding that
the purported group did not deserve protected status because it lacked
“visibility,” concluding “the very nature of the conduct at issue is such
that it is generally out of the public view.”53  This case planted the
seed of the BIA’s new PSG formulation, and the rule would germinate
over a series of ensuing cases.
The BIA solidified the social visibility requirement in subsequent
decisions.  In 2007, the Board rejected the claim that membership in a
group consisting of “affluent Guatemalans” warranted protected sta-
tus.54  While reaffirming the social visibility test set out in In re C-A-,
the BIA also established “particularity” as a second prong of the PSG
determination: “The characteristic of wealth or affluence is simply too
subjective, inchoate, and variable to provide the sole basis for mem-
bership in a particular social group.”55  Thus, the possession of an im-
mutable characteristic56 would not be enough for asylum applicants.
Under the formulation created by cases like In re C-A- and In re A-M-
E & J-G-U-, the BIA would also consider whether the applicant’s pur-
ported social group was socially visible and distinguishable on an ob-
jectively observable basis (i.e. particular).  However, one year later the
BIA would change these characteristics from being simply matters of
consideration to determinative requirements.
c. One Summer Day in 2008: In re S-E-G- and In re E-A-G-
On July 30, 2008, the BIA decided two very similar cases that re-
vised the formulation governing PSG status under the INA.  One was
In re E-A-G-,57 a case in which the BIA denied asylum to an applicant
who claimed membership in the PSGs of “young persons who are per-
ceived to be affiliated with gangs” and “persons resistant to gang
membership.”58  The “companion”59 to this case was In re S-E-G-,60 in
50. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 957.
51. Id. at 958–60.
52. Id. at 958.
53. Id. at 959–60.
54. A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 69 (B.I.A. 2007).
55. Id. at 76.
56. See supra subsection II.B.2.a.
57. E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (B.I.A. 2008).
58. Id. at 593.
59. Id.
60. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008).
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which the BIA also denied asylum to a purported member of two
groups: “Salvadoran youths who have resisted gang recruitment, or
family members of such Salvadoran youth.”61  In each case, the BIA
rejected the asylum claim on the ground that neither possessed social
visibility,62 establishing for the first time that such a characteristic,
along with particularity, is required for protected status under the
INA’s PSG classification.
In In re S-E-G-, the BIA claimed the “concepts of ‘particularity’ and
‘social visibility’ give greater specificity to the definition of a social
group” and thus deferred to the judgment of the past decisions of In re
C-A- and In re A-M-E- & J-G-U- regarding those concepts.63  However,
the Board subtly altered those prior decisions by defining the two
group characteristics as “requirements” under the PSG formulation.64
This alteration, in conjunction with the doctrine of Chevron, makes
these two cases landmarks in federal asylum law, and they would play
a crucial role in the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Gaitan.
C. Gaitan v. Holder
1. Facts and Procedural History
In 2000, a twelve-year-old Salvadoran boy named Oscar Alexander
Granados Gaitan was approached by members of one of the most infa-
mous gangs in the world, Mara Salvatrucha, or “MS-13.”65  After two
years of refusing invitations to join MS-13 and being subjected to vio-
lent threats against himself and his family, Gaitan entered the United
States without inspection in April 2002.66  The United States Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings
against Gaitan in August 2007, and he was ordered to appear before
an IJ for an individual merits hearing.67
After admitting the factual allegations and conceding the charge of
removability, Gaitan sought relief from removal by way of asylum,
withholding of removal, and the Convention Against Torture on the
grounds that he was a protected member of a PSG consisting of “young
61. Id. at 582.
62. See id. at 579; E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 591.
63. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 582.
64. See id. at 584 (emphasis added) (“The essence of the ‘particularity’ requirement
. . . is whether the proposed group can accurately be described in a manner suffi-
ciently distinct that the group would be recognized, in the society in question, as
a discrete class of persons.”); see also id. at 586–87 (emphasis added) (“The ques-
tion whether a proposed group has a shared characteristic with the requisite ‘so-
cial visibility’ must be considered in the context of the country of concern and the
persecution feared.”).
65. Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 679 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 11-1525, 2012 WL
2367600 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2012).
66. Id.
67. Id.
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males that have been previously recruited by MS-13 and are opposed
to the nature of gangs.”68  The IJ rejected Gaitan’s claims on two ba-
ses: first, Gaitan’s testimony did not meet the required standard of
credibility; and second, even if the credibility standard had been met,
Gaitan’s purported PSG did not meet the standard set out in In re S-
E-G-, which the IJ found to be controlling.69
On appeal, the BIA issued a single-member decision overturning
the IJ’s credibility ruling, yet affirming the decision on the merits.70
The BIA concluded that the IJ correctly applied controlling weight to
In re S-E-G-.71
2. Majority Opinion
The majority in Gaitan based its denial of the asylum petition on
two prior cases: Constanza72 and Ortiz-Puentes.73  These cases for-
mally brought to the Eighth Circuit the concrete requirements of par-
ticularity and social visibility.74  Both prior cases involved petitioners
similar to Gaitan—individuals who had fled gang violence in Central
America and sought asylum in the United States as members of PSGs
consisting of persons resistant to gang activity.75  And in both cases,
the court adopted the BIA’s asylum standards of In re S-E-G-, denying
the petitions on the basis that their purported social groups lacked
particularity and social visibility.76  Thus, the majority in Gaitan had
the apparently simple task of following its previous decisions,77 as
those decisions so closely resembled the fact pattern of the petitioner
at bar.
3. Concurring Opinion
But for being held by prior controlling decisions, the concurrence in
Gaitan would have strongly dissented against the majority.78  The
problem for the concurrence was not so much that Gaitan’s case dif-
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 2011).
73. Ortiz-Puentes v. Holder, 662 F.3d 481 (8th Cir. 2011).
74. Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 681.
75. See Constanza, 647 F.3d at 752; Ortiz-Puentes, 662 F.3d at 483.
76. See Constanza, 647 F.3d at 753–54; Ortiz-Puentes, 662 F.3d at 483.
77. The court was bound pursuant to Owsley v. Luebbers, 281 F.3d 687, 690 (8th Cir.
2002) (“It is a cardinal rule in our circuit that one panel is bound by the decision
of a prior panel.”).
78. Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 682 (Bye, J., concurring) (“I [concur] reluctantly . . . and write
separately to express my disagreement with our circuit’s as-a-matter-of-course
adoption of ‘social visibility’ and ‘particularity’ as requirements for establishing
‘membership in a particular social group.’”).
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fered from that of Constanza or Ortiz-Puentes, but the way in which
the Eighth Circuit so effortlessly adopted the standards of the BIA:
While both decisions cited with approval the BIA’s new approach to defining
“particular social group,” neither had before it the issue raised in this appeal:
did the BIA act arbitrarily and capriciously in adding the requirements of “so-
cial visibility” and “particularity” to its definition of “particular social group.”
While I am convinced it did, I am nonetheless bound by circuit precedent and
therefore concur in the result.79
The concurrence concluded that because the BIA did not explain its
reasons for diverting from the Acosta formulation, the additional PSG
requirements should have been disregarded by the Eighth Circuit in
Constanza and Ortiz-Puentes.80  Nonetheless, the concurrence held
true to controlling precedent.81
III. ANALYSIS
The Eighth Circuit should overturn Gaitan on two grounds.  First,
the court erred in holding that its decision was mandated by Con-
stanza and Ortis-Puentes, since Gaitan raised an issue that neither of
the court’s precedents answered—whether the BIA’s new PSG stan-
dard is arbitrary and capricious.  Second, the BIA’s new PSG formula-
tion is arbitrary and capricious under Chevron, and insofar as the
Eighth Circuit gave deference to the BIA’s unreasonable interpreta-
tion of the INA, Gaitan should be overturned.  In its stead, the court
should demand in future cases that the BIA return to its original
Acosta formulation, a well-grounded and reasonable standard by
which to adjudicate PSG claims.
A. Grounds for Overturning Gaitan
1. Neither Constanza nor Ortiz-Puentes Was Controlling
Precedent
The court in Gaitan denied the applicant’s claim of asylum on the
grounds that two precedent Eighth Circuit cases, Constanza and Or-
tiz-Puentes, rejected petitioners with PSG claims indistinguishable
from Gaitan’s.82  Citing Owsley v. Luebbers83 for the proposition that
“[i]t is a cardinal rule in our circuit that one panel is bound by the
decision of a prior panel,”84 the court based its holding strictly on the
outcome of those two prior cases.85  While appearing to be doctrinally
79. Id.
80. Id. at 686.
81. Id.
82. Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 681.
83. 281 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 2002).
84. Id. at 690.
85. Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 681.
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correct, the court misapplied stare decisis by giving controlling weight
to two cases that were decided on wholly different issues.
As Justice Bye in his concurrence argued, neither Constanza nor
Ortiz-Puentes was decided against the contention that the BIA’s re-
quirements of particularity and social visibility are arbitrary and ca-
pricious.86  Instead, in each case the court adopted the BIA’s two
requirements “as-a-matter-of-course”87 and applied them to the peti-
tioners at bar.88  Because the petitioners in each prior case merely ar-
gued that their purported PSGs met the BIA’s two requirements, the
Eighth Circuit was not forced to weigh on the prudence of the new BIA
formulation.  Gaitan would not make the same mistake but would put
the court to this test.
The court in Gaitan readily acknowledged the petitioner’s claim:
“Gaitan asserts that these requirements are not entitled to deference
by this Court because they are ‘conflicting, confusing, and illogical.’ ”89
The court even appeared to treat the case as one of first impression:
“At the time that he filed his appeal, Gaitan was correct that no panel
of this Court had gone so far as to refer to social visibility and particu-
larity as requirements.”90  Regardless of these acknowledgments,
however, the court quickly and erroneously concluded that the BIA
met the deference test merely because of its two prior decisions, Con-
stanza and Ortis-Puentes: “We are bound by the decision of earlier
panels.  As a result, this Court cannot find that the social visibility
and particularity requirements articulated in In re S-E-G are arbi-
trary or capricious.”91  The court made this conclusion even though
the “decisions of earlier panels” never considered whether the require-
ments were arbitrary or capricious.  This overly formulistic reasoning
is a perversion of stare decisis, and it is not worthy of continued adher-
ence.  Gaitan and the rest of the Eighth Circuit deserved a hearing on
the legal prudence of the BIA’s new asylum formulation.  Because
both were robbed of this necessary juridical development, Gaitan
should be overturned by future Eighth Circuit courts.
86. Id. at 682 (Bye, J., concurring).
87. Id.
88. See Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 2011); Ortiz-Puentes v. Holder,
662 F.3d 481 (8th Cir. 2011); see also Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624 (8th
Cir. 2008) (This was the first Eighth Circuit case to address the particularity and
social visibility requirements, deferring to In re A-M-E & J-G-U.  The court in
Davila-Mejia, like Constanza and Ortiz-Puentes, also was not faced with the con-
tention that the two requirements are arbitrary and capricious.).
89. Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 681.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citation omitted).
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2. The New Particular Social Group Formulation Adopted from
the BIA Is Arbitrary and Capricious, and Thus
Should Not Be Given Chevron Deference
Chevron mandates that courts give deference only to agency statu-
tory interpretations that are not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.”92  This standard was expounded upon in Na-
tional Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Ser-
vices,93 which held that Chevron deference is not owed to agency
interpretations that are inconsistent with past interpretations and
that are not adequately explained by the agency.94  The fact that the
Eighth Circuit gave deference to the BIA’s new PSG formulation with-
out applying the Brand X standard is grounds for overturning Gaitan.
The BIA’s current PSG standard fails Brand X because (1) the addi-
tion of particularity and social visibility as requirements to the PSG
ground of asylum is inconsistent with the BIA’s past interpretation of
PSG under the Acosta standard, (2) the BIA’s departure from Acosta
was not adequately explained, and (3) the new PSG formulation will
create arbitrary and capricious results when applied by future Boards
and federal courts.
a. The BIA’s New PSG Formulation Is Inconsistent with Past
Interpretation
In order for an agency’s statutory interpretation to be denied Chev-
ron deference by the court, Brand X first requires that the interpreta-
tion be inconsistent with past practice.95  This element is easily met
by the BIA’s new interpretation of the PSG standard.  The addition of
the particularity and social visibility requirements to the PSG deter-
mination is not only inconsistent on its face with the Acosta standard,
but also in effect: the newly heightened standard has left PSGs vul-
nerable that would have and already have met the Acosta standard.
The new PSG standard, promulgated by the BIA in the numerous
cases since In re C-A-, is facially and logically distinct from the Acosta
standard.  Even though the BIA has not expressly abandoned the
Acosta ‘immutable characteristics’ test since adding the two require-
ments of particularity and social visibility,96 the layering of the addi-
tional requirements to the PSG determination marks a significant
departure from the Board’s prior adherence to Acosta and thus consti-
92. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
93. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
94. Id. at 981.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 593 (B.I.A. 2008) (citing Acosta, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 211, 233–34 (B.I.A. 1985)); A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 73 (B.I.A.
2007) (citing Ortunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 352 (5th Cir. 2002)).
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tutes the kind of inconsistency Brand X contemplated.97  This change
of course, however, is not just cosmetic; the facial inconsistency will
have material effects on asylum adjudications.
The BIA’s new PSG standard applied by the Eight Circuit in
Gaitan will eliminate good asylum precedent created under the Acosta
standard.  This narrowing effect will unjustifiably leave vulnerable
asylum-seeking members of certain PSGs that once satisfied the
Acosta standard but will inevitably fail the particularity and social
visibility requirements.98  Such PSGs as women threatened with fe-
male genital mutilation, homosexuals, and former police officers make
up some of these discarded groups.99  Each group has already been
granted asylum under the Acosta standard100 yet would undoubtedly
be rejected by the BIA acting under the current PSG formulation for
lacking social visibility.101  By accepting the social visibility and par-
ticularity requirements, the Eighth Circuit in Gaitan joined the BIA
in narrowing the bases on which persecuted individuals can seek ref-
97. See Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as
Amicus Curiae at 10, Thomas, No. A75-597-033/-034/-035/-036 (B.I.A. 2007)
[hereinafter UNHCR, Amicus Curiae], available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/45c34c244.html (“The Board in Acosta did not require either a ‘so-
cial perception’ or ‘social visibility’ test, and UNHCR would caution the Board
against adopting such a rigid approach which may disregard groups that the Con-
vention is designed to protect.”); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 663
F.3d 582, 608 (3rd Cir. 2011) (“[T]he BIA’s addition of the requirements of ‘social
visibility’ and ‘particularity’ to its definition of ‘particular social group’ is incon-
sistent with its prior decisions . . . .”); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th
Cir. 2009) (“[R]egarding ‘social visibility’ as a criterion for determining ‘particular
social group,’ the Board has been inconsistent rather than silent.”).
98. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 604 (“If a member of any of these [previ-
ously asserted PSGs] applied for asylum today, the BIA’s ‘social visibility’ re-
quirement would pose an insurmountable obstacle to refugee status, even though
the BIA has already held that membership in any of these groups qualifies for
refugee status if an alien can establish that s/he was persecuted ‘on account of’
that group membership.”).
99. Sternberg, supra note 19, at 285.
100. See Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365–66 (B.I.A. 1996) (“The defined
social group [of young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had
FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice] meets the test we
set forth in Matter of Acosta . . . .”); Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 820–23
(B.I.A. 1990) (holding that Cuban homosexuals are a valid particular social
group). Cf. Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 662 (B.I.A. 1988) (recognizing “status as
a former member of the national police” to be an “immutable characteristic,” the
court acknowledged the possibility “that mistreatment occurring because of such
a status in appropriate circumstances could be found to be persecution on account
of political opinion or membership in a particular social group”).
101. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 604 (“The members of each of these groups
have characteristics which are completely internal to the individual and cannot
be observed or known by other members of the society in question (or even other
members of the group) unless and until the individual member chooses to make
that characteristic known.”).
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uge in this country by eliminating valid BIA precedent, a change that
has been implemented without the required proper agency
explanation.
b. The BIA Departed from Acosta Without Properly
Explaining Its Reasons
The Eighth Circuit in Gaitan should not have given deference to
the BIA’s new PSG formulation because the BIA did not properly ex-
plain why it departed from the Acosta standard.  This was the objec-
tion of the reluctant concurrence in Gaitan, which relied on the rule in
Brand X102: In applying the Chevron standard, “[u]nexplained incon-
sistency is . . . a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary
and capricious change from agency practice.”103  Agencies are allowed
to shift their interpretation, the Supreme Court stated, if they “ade-
quately” explain their reasons because Chevron intended to leave dis-
cretion to those agencies to deal with ambiguities in legislation.104
Since the BIA exercised this discretion in its range of cases that
shifted the PSG formulation105 but gave untenable reasons for doing
so, the Eighth Circuit should have deemed the formulation arbitrary
and capricious and refused to pay it deference in Gaitan.
The BIA made its initial departure from Acosta in In re C-A- when
it added “visibility”—or “the extent to which members of the pur-
ported group would be recognizable to others”106—to the PSG formu-
lation.  The reasoning the Board used to explain its shift was tenuous
at best.  First, the BIA purported to rely on its own precedent but did
so in a questionable manner.  The Board stated that it was guided by
“[o]ur other decisions recognizing particular social groups [that] in-
volved characteristics that were highly visible and recognizable by
others in the country in question,”107 suggesting that social visibility
was less of a formal, precedential consideration, and more of a trend
among a handful of previous cases.108  The Board also took a closer
102. Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 685–86 (8th Cir.) (Bye, J., concurring), reh’g de-
nied, 683 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 526 (U.S. 2012).
103. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981
(2005).
104. Id.  The agency construction must also be “reasonable” for Chevron to apply. Id.
at 980.
105. See supra subsection III.A.2.a.
106. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (B.I.A. 2006) (emphasis added), aff’d, Castillo-Arias
v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006).
107. Id. at 960 (emphasis added).
108. See Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining
a “Particular Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related
to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 64 (2008) (“All of
[the decisions cited by the BIA] turned on an Acosta analysis based on immutable
characteristics, not social perception or visibility.”).
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look at its previous decision in In re H-109 to justify its consideration of
social visibility.110  That case, however, hardly established an entirely
new and distinct consideration of social visibility. In re H- and the pre-
cedent that it relied upon merely referred to “recognizable” as an ex-
tension of  “discrete”111—i.e., the already-established requirement
that social groups be particular.112  For instance, in Gomez v.
I.N.S.,113 authority relied on by the BIA in In Re H-, the Second Cir-
cuit stated: “Like the traits which distinguish the other four enumer-
ated categories[—]race, religion, nationality and political opinion[—
]the attributes of a particular social group must be recognizable and
discrete.  Possession of broadly-based characteristics . . . will not by
itself endow individuals with membership in a particular group.”114
Surely, the court in Gomez was not arguing that inconspicuous char-
acteristics such as religious affiliation or political opinion are socially
visible characteristics in the sense that “members . . . would be recog-
nizable to others”115 around them.116  This leap in logicindicates that
the social visibility determination that the BIA in In re C-A- claimed
was well-established had no precedential foundation at all and that it
existed merely as an elaboration on the particularity requirement, not
a totally separate prong of the PSG formulation.
The reason for the BIA’s dubious adherence to precedent has to do
with the second ground on which it incorrectly justified the social visi-
bility consideration and departed from Acosta—a misinterpretation of
international asylum standards concerning what “social visibility”
109. H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337 (B.I.A. 1996).
110. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 959–60.
111. H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 342 (citing Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir.
1991)).
112. See Sternberg, supra note 19, at 292–93 (quoting S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584
(B.I.A. 2008)) (“According to the BIA, ‘[t]he essence of the ‘particularity’ require-
ment . . . is whether the proposed group can accurately be described in a manner
sufficiently distinct that the group would be recognized, in the society in ques-
tion, as a discrete class of persons.’  As this excerpt highlights, social visibility
and particularity are not distinct tests.  Emphasizing this blending of the two
tests, the Third Circuit concluded that particularity merely articulates the same
concept underlying social visibility, and ultimately rejected the particularity re-
quirement.  The inability to meaningfully distinguish particularity from social
visibility illustrates that particularity is not a coherent legal test.”).
113. Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
114. Id. at 664.
115. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 959.
116. See Brian Soucek, Comment, Social Group Asylum Claims: A Second Look at the
New Visibility Requirement, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 337, 341–42 (2010) (cita-
tions omitted) (“In the list ‘race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion,’ visibility is hardly the common element; race
may be visible to the eye, but religion and political opinion generally require ‘evi-
dence of things not seen.’”); see also Marouf, supra note 108, at 68–69 (explaining R
that, because of the “key differences” between Gomez and the “new ‘social visibil-
ity’ test,” Gomez “fails to justify or explain ‘C-A-’s social visibility requirement’”).
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was originally intended to mean and how it was to be implemented.
In In re C-A-, the BIA relied on guidelines issued by the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees117 (UNHCR) as confirmation
“that ‘visibility’ is an important element in identifying the existence of
a particular social group.”118  While this statement was facially con-
sistent with the UNHCR’s guidelines, the way in which the BIA has
applied those guidelines has been problematic in two ways.
First the BIA, in In re C-A- and subsequent cases, misconstrued
what the UNHCR meant by “visibility.”  The BIA has defined its own
view of “social visibility” as requiring a characteristic that is physi-
cally visible in the eyes of the surrounding public.119  However, this
contradicts the interpretation by the very body that the BIA has con-
sistently cited to in its definition.120  In reference to the “social percep-
tion” approach previously discussed in its own guidelines,121 the
UNHCR stated that “members of a group need not be easily recogniza-
ble to the general public in order for the group as a whole to be per-
ceived by society as a particular social group.”122  In essence, the BIA
replaced the UNHCR’s objective standard of “social perception”123
with its own subjective standard of “social visibility,” which focuses on
what members of the community actually perceive about the PSG in
question.124
117. U.N. High Comm’r on Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: “Member-
ship of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951
Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc.
HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter UNHCR, Guidelines].  The UNHCR
describes itself as “mandated by the United Nations to lead and coordinate inter-
national action for the worldwide protection of refugees and the resolution of ref-
ugee problems.  UNHCR’s primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and well-
being of refugees. . . . UNHCR shall provide for the protection of refugees by, inter
alia, ‘promoting the conclusion and ratification of international conventions for
the protection of refugees, supervising their application and proposing amend-
ments thereto.’”  UNHCR, Amicus Curiae, supra note 97, at 1. R
118. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960.
119. See id. (rejecting asylum to “confidential informants” on the basis that “the very
nature of the conduct at issue is such that it is generally out of the public view”).
120. See Marouf, supra note 108, at 64 (“[A]lthough the BIA referenced the UNHCR R
Guidelines, it did not truly apply the ‘social perception’ approach set forth
therein.”).
121. See UNHCR, Guidelines, supra note 117, ¶ 7. R
122. UNHCR, Amicus Curiae, supra note 97, at 8 (citations omitted) (“For instance, R
the general population in Cuba would not automatically recognize homosexuals,
nor would average Salvadorans necessarily recognize former members of the na-
tional police, nor would a typical Togolese tribal member inevitably be aware of
young women who opposed female genital mutilation but had not been subjected
to the practice.”).
123. “The question to be established is whether the particular social group is
‘cognisable’ as a group, viewed objectively in terms of the relevant society.” Id. at
7 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
124. Marouf, supra note 108, at 49. R
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Second, notwithstanding its misunderstanding of the UNHCR’s
terminology, the BIA misinterpreted the UNHCR’s reference to the
“social perception” test125 as a second requirement along with the
Acosta “immutable characteristics” test.  The UNHCR did not intend
for its PSG formulation to contain two prongs which both had to be
met, but instead intended that the two prongs would be alternative
avenues to meet the PSG standard.126  Recognizing the validity of the
two tests, the UNHCR meant to reconcile both into “a single standard
that incorporates both dominant approaches: a particular social group
is a group of persons who share a common characteristic other than
their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by soci-
ety.”127  In other words, social perception was meant to cover what
Acosta could not: “If a claimant alleges a social group that is based on
a characteristic determined to be neither unalterable or fundamental,
further analysis should be undertaken to determine whether the
group is nonetheless perceived as a cognizable group in that soci-
ety.”128  While the BIA in In re C-A- basically adhered to this interpre-
tation, the subsequent Board decisions that relied on that case as
precedent completely eliminated it by requiring that a PSG meet both
the Acosta standard and the “social visibility” standard.129
Since the BIA departed from the Acosta “immutable characteris-
tics” standard and failed to give a well-conceived explanation for doing
so, the Eighth Circuit should not have given deference to the new BIA
standard challenged in Gaitan.  The Board’s reliance on precedent
that in no way supported a social visibility requirement in the PSG
determination, and its misinterpretation of international standards
promulgated by UNHCR, fails to satisfy the rule in Brand X that an
agency must “adequately explain[ ] the reasons for a reversal of policy”
in order to receive Chevron deference.130  “[T]he BIA’s failure to offer
any reasonable explanation for its new interpretation distinguishes
the situation at hand from cases where courts have granted substan-
tial deference despite a revised agency interpretation because of a
‘well-considered basis for the change.’”131  The BIA’s PSG formula-
125. See UNHCR, Guidelines, supra note 117, ¶ 7. R
126. See UNCHR, Amicus Curiae, supra note 97, at 9. R
127. UNHCR, Guidelines, supra note 117, ¶ 11 (emphasis added). R
128. Id. ¶ 13 (“So, for example, if it were determined that owning a shop or participat-
ing in a certain occupation in a particular society is neither unchangeable nor a
fundamental aspect of human identity, a shopkeeper or members of a particular
profession might nonetheless constitute a particular social group if in the society
they are recognized as a group which sets them apart.”).
129. See S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. 579 (B.I.A. 2008); E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (B.I.A. 2008);
A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007).
130. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981
(2005) (emphasis added).
131. Marouf, supra note 108, at 68 (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens’ Coun- R
cil, 490 U.S. 332, 356 (1989)).
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tion, requiring social visibility and particularity, is thus arbitrary and
capricious under Chevron, and the Eighth Circuit’s ruling in Gaitan
giving it deference should be overturned.
c. The New BIA Formulation Will Lead to Arbitrary and
Capricious Results
Notwithstanding the BIA’s improperly explained departure from
Acosta, the BIA’s new PSG formulation approved by Gaitan does not
meet the Chevron standard because the formulation will lead to arbi-
trary and capricious results when applied by future tribunals.  The
BIA’s new PSG standard cannot be relied upon to produce consistent,
predictable results in future BIA and federal court decisions because
there has been no judicial consensus regarding the exact definition of
“social visibility” and any attempt to satisfy the formulation creates
severe evidentiary problems.  The inevitable arbitrary and capricious
outcomes are grounds for rejecting Chevron deference to that BIA in-
terpretation—insofar as the Eighth Circuit gave that deference in
Gaitan, its decision should be overturned.
First, the BIA’s new PSG formulation will cause arbitrary and ca-
pricious asylum determinations because the BIA and courts applying
the formulation have not agreed on what the social visibility standard
is.  Regardless of the merits of either the “social visibility” approach or
the “social perception” (or “external criterion”132) approach,133 the fact
that both have been recognized in applying the BIA’s new PSG inter-
pretation makes inconsistent and arbitrary results inevitable.134
Judge Posner made his view on this issue perfectly clear: “Often it is
unclear whether the Board is using the term ‘social visibility’ in the
literal sense or in the ‘external criterion’ sense, or even . . . whether it
understands the difference.”135  One thing is clear—the lack of a stan-
132. See Benitez-Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009) (term used by
Judge Posner synonymous with the UNHCR’s “social perception” approach and in
contradistinction to literal visibility).
133. For a discussion on these two approaches and their meanings, see supra subsec-
tion III.A.2.b.
134. See Kristin A. Bresnahan, Note, The Board of Immigration Appeals’s New “Social
Visibility” Test for Determining “Membership of a Particular Social Group” in
Asylum Claims and Its Legal and Policy Implications, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
649, 670–71 (2011). Compare Rodriguez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., No. 09-2593, slip
op. at 217 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming a BIA decision that upheld an immigration
judge’s asylum determination, which rejected a petitioner’s PSG claim on the ba-
sis that “it is unlikely that anyone would be able to tell from looking at him that
he is HIV positive”), with Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 261 (2d Cir.
2007) (citation omitted) (recognizing the “social perception” approach, claiming
that “a group’s ‘visibility’ [means] the extent to which members of society perceive
those with the relevant characteristic as members of a social group”).
135. Benitez-Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Soucek,
supra note 116, at 340 (citation omitted) (“[Quick] was the Board’s shift within R
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dard definition has endowed the BIA with overwhelming discretion in
choosing which test to apply.136
An example of how this judicial discrepancy in the meaning of so-
cial visibility creates arbitrary and capricious outcomes is the common
PSG claim based on a characteristic intentionally concealed from view
by the petitioner.  The Seventh Circuit emphasized that “[i]f you are a
member of a group that has been targeted for . . . persecution, you will
take pains to avoid being socially visible,”137 and such individuals
should not be forced to resort to “pinning a target to their backs.”138
However, this is what the “social visibility” test would require of
noncitizens with such characteristics as homosexuality claiming PSG
status because such a trait is not physically apparent to others.  On
the other hand, as one commentator has claimed, homosexuals are
“recognized as [a] particular social group[ ] in the United States,”139
and, therefore, a tribunal applying the “social perceptions” test would
surely agree that such a characteristic would warrant PSG status.
Thus, those who belong to a PSG that includes individuals with a
characteristic that must be hidden in order to avoid persecution are at
the whim of whichever social visibility standard the reviewing Board
or court subscribes to.  Until one social visibility definition is agreed
upon by the Board and the federal judiciary for purposes of PSG deter-
mination, the new BIA formulation should be deemed arbitrary and
capricious and not worthy of deference.
Second, there are serious evidentiary problems in proving social
visibility that will lead future tribunals to arbitrary and capricious
asylum outcomes.  This is particularly dangerous given the wide def-
erence conferred by appellate courts to IJs’ initial factual findings.140
Since the “social visibility” test is “subjective and sociological in na-
ture, not based on legal norms and principles” as the Acosta “immuta-
ble characteristics” test is, “it poses unique evidentiary challenges and
likely will result in inconsistent and incoherent decisions.”141
Matter of C-A- from groups that are ‘easily recognizable and understood by others
to constitute social groups’ to the claim that previous decisions ‘recognizing par-
ticular social groups involved characteristics that were highly visible and recog-
nizable by others in the country in question.’  This shift from figurative to literal
sight occurred in the space of a single paragraph . . . .”).
136. Marouf, supra note 108, at 106. R
137. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009).
138. Id. at 616.
139. Marouf, supra note 108, at 79. R
140. See Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 516 (8th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (“An
IJ’s factual determinations must be upheld if supported by reasonable, substan-
tial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.  This standard is
a deferential one, requiring a reviewing court to uphold a denial of asylum unless
an alien demonstrates that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no
reasonable fact finder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.”).
141. Marouf, supra note 108, at 71. R
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Namely, courts cannot get into the minds of the persecutor when try-
ing to link the petitioner’s persecution to her social visibility, not even
through circumstantial evidence.142  The result is that adjudicators
will rely too heavily on the factor of past persecution in identifying the
particular social group, confusing the overall asylum analysis.143  Be-
cause this evidentiary confusion will lead to arbitrary and capricious
asylum outcomes, the new PSG formulation that creates it should be
denied deference.
B. A Return to Acosta and the Immutable Characteristics
Test
The Eighth Circuit should overturn its decision in Gaitan for the
aforementioned reasons and demand that the BIA adhere to the
Acosta standard that governed asylum applications for two decades.
By doing so, the Eighth Circuit would follow the lead of the Third and
Seventh Circuits in refusing to defer to the arbitrary and capricious
interpretation of the BIA and would effectively avoid the multitude of
problems that such deference has caused.144  Such a solution “prop-
erly applies Chevron, is easiest to apply, has a basis in coherent statu-
tory analysis, comports with international obligations, and rejects the
problematic social visibility test and particularity requirement.”145
The Acosta standard was, from its genesis and through twenty
years of BIA and appellate court adherence, loyally followed and
championed for its effectiveness and reasonability in governing PSG
asylum applications. Acosta has been lauded for its conformance to
the original intent of those who first established international asylum
standards.146  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals also praised
Acosta for “[striking] an acceptable balance between (1) rendering
‘particular social group’ a catch-all for all groups who might claim per-
secution, which could render the other four categories meaningless,
and (2) rendering ‘particular social group’ a nullity by making its re-
quirements too stringent or too specific.”147  American courts are not
alone in their approval of the “immutable characteristics” approach—
142. Id.
143. Id. at 76.
144. See, e.g., Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011);
Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2009).
145. Sternberg, supra note 19, at 291.
146. Id. at 293 (quoting JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 158–61
(1991)) (“By basing the definition of ‘membership of a particular social group’ on
application of the ejusdem generis principle, we respect both the specific situation
known to the drafters—concern for the plight of persons whose social origins put
them at comparable risk to those in the other enumerated categories—and
the more general commitment to grounding refugee claims in civil or political
status . . . .”).
147. Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1197 (11th Cir. 2006).
3397-neb_92-2 Sheet No. 111 Side B      12/12/2013   14:12:17
3397-neb_92-2 Sheet No. 111 Side B      12/12/2013   14:12:17
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\92-2\NEB206.txt unknown Seq: 22 20-NOV-13 12:25
452 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:431
the Acosta standard controlled asylum cases so effectively and fairly
that it found itself in courts of foreign countries, cited for its
reasonability.148
The reason for this domestic and international acclaim is the pru-
dence and utility of the Acosta standard, qualities that are missing
from the new PSG formulation.  The Acosta standard does not suffer
from the kind of evidentiary problems created by the social visibility
requirement—the subjective focus of how the persecuted are viewed
by others is too unreliable for consistent and reasonable applica-
tion.149  Moreover, the Acosta approach solves the problem that con-
cerned Judge Posner about the social visibility requirement—denying
asylum to those who claim PSG membership based on an immutable
characteristic they intentionally had kept socially invisible.150  Under
Acosta, an immutable characteristic, like homosexuality, need not be
visible to anyone in order to meet PSG status.  Because this standard
avoids arbitrary and capricious results, fosters consistent and reason-
able asylum determinations, and is firmly rooted in prior BIA and in-
ternational standards, the Eighth Circuit should affirm its loyalty to
the Acosta PSG formulation after overturning Gaitan.
IV. CONCLUSION
Asylum is a body of law crucial to many who seek the kind of ref-
uge the United States has offered since before it even existed.  Though
fundamentally a legislative and administrative matter, the federal ju-
diciary will be most likely the one responsible for repairing the PSG
standard.  While the Supreme Court was correct in asserting that
courts should have no role in writing immigration policy in place of
the responsible federal agencies,151 the individual circuits, as the
Eighth Circuit is urged here, possess this duty for two reasons.
First, neither Congress nor the executive branch, nor even the Su-
preme Court, will agree to restore the PSG formulation to its prudent
origins.  Congress made an attempt in 2011 with the concurrent intro-
duction of two bills in the House and Senate that intended to codify
Acosta as the formal PSG standard.152  The bills’ introduction and
subsequent failure getting out of committee153 suggest two reasonable
148. Marouf, supra note 108, at 54–57 (referring to authorities in Canada, New Zea- R
land, and the United Kingdom).
149. Id. at 104.
150. See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009).
151. Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006).
152. See Refugee Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 2185, 112th Cong. § 5(a)(D) (2011); Ref-
ugee Protection Act of 2011, S. 1202, 112th Cong. § 5(a)(D) (2011).
153. See Refugee Protection Act of 2011 (H.R. 2185), GOVTRACK.US, http://www.gov
track.us/congress/bills/112/hr2185 (last visited Nov. 4, 2012); Refugee Protection
Act of 2011 (S. 1202), GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/
s1202 (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).
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assumptions: first, that the current PSG standard is in dire need of
reform, but second, that Congress will unlikely be the vehicle for that
reform in the near future.154  The executive branch has the ability to
repair the PSG formulation, as well.  The Attorney General has the
discretion to review BIA cases and could exercise it in overturning the
Board’s new PSG formulation.155  No such action has occurred.  Alter-
natively, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) could promul-
gate new rules regarding membership in a PSG that adhere to the
Acosta standard.  However, it has been nearly three years since DHS
has proposed such rulemaking.156  Finally, the Supreme Court re-
mains extremely reluctant to weigh in on the PSG formulation.157  Re-
cent to this writing, the Court denied certiorari to review Gaitan.158
Second, the remedial measures urged of the Eighth Circuit here
are well within its authority.  Restoring the Acosta standard as con-
trolling for PSG determinations is simply carrying out the Supreme
Court’s mandate in Chevron—rejecting an administrative interpreta-
tion because it is arbitrary and capricious.159  After doing so, the
Eighth Circuit should then remand future cases to the BIA to be de-
termined by the Acosta formulation, as the Seventh Circuit has
done.160
This reform will be too late for the likes of Gaitan—he has already
been subjected to the unjustifiable and unreasonable PSG standards
concocted by the BIA.  However, many more are in line behind him
seeking refuge in the United States.  The Eighth Circuit owes them
the chance to state their case under a well-founded and prudent legal
standard.  The court should do this by overturning Gaitan and restor-
ing integrity to future Eighth Circuit asylum determinations.
154. See Sternberg, supra note 19, at 290–91 (citing RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., R41704, OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION ISSUES IN THE 112TH CONGRESS
1 (2011)).
155. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.01(h)(1)(i) (2012).
156. See Statement of Regulatory Priorities, 74 Fed. Reg. 64,213, 64,220 (Dec. 7,
2009).
157. See Sternberg, supra note 19, at 253 n.50 (citing Stanley Dale Radtke, Defining a
Core Zone of Protection in Asylum Law: Refocusing the Analysis of Membership in
a Particular Social Group to Utilize Both the Social Visibility and Group Immuta-
bility Component Approaches, 10 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 22, 37 (2008)) (“The
[Supreme] Court has never expressly decided the meaning of PSG.”).
158. Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678 (8th Cir.), reh’g denied, 683 F.3d 951 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 526 (U.S. 2012).
159. See supra subsection III.A.2.
160. See, e.g., Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 618 (7th Cir. 2009).
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